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11 Introduction
In this paper, we formulate a partial search model to investigate how dis-
persal policies for refugee immigrants may aﬀect their labour market inte-
gration. Dispersal policies on refugee immigrants are carried out in the US,
Germany, the Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark and to some extent also
in Sweden. Under the dispersal policies, new refugee immigrants are located
away from immigrant-dense areas. The main justiﬁcation for carrying out
such dispersal policies is that residential concentration and segregation of
immigrants are commonly believed to hamper the integration process of im-
migrants by slowing down the acquisition of country-speciﬁc human capital,
such as language skills and knowledge about the host country. Hence, this
argument rests on the abundant evidence of slow labour market integration
of refugee immigrants. This issue has not been studied extensively, neither
from a theoretical nor from an empirical perspective. The purpose of these
two companion papers is to perform such an investigation theoretically as
well as empirically.
Some empirical evidence exists on relocation eﬀects of settlement policies,
see for example Djuve and Kavli (2000), Åslund (2001), Hummelgaard et
al. (1995) and Damm (2003) for relocation eﬀects for Norway, Sweden and
Denmark, respectively. These studies show very high relocation rates out
of small municipalities toward the larger towns and cities during the ﬁrst
two-three years after the initial settlement.1
However, as hinted at above, little empirical evidence exists on the labour
market eﬀects of settlement policies for the individuals subjected to the poli-
136% of the 20,000 refugee immigrants who were located away from immigrant-dense
areas in Norway during 1994-1996 had moved away from the municipality of assignment
at the end of 1999. The general relocation pattern was that the further away from the
metropolitan area in South Norway a refugee immigrant had been placed, the higher the
probability of leaving the region. As much as 57% of the refugee immigrants located in
the Northern part of Norway left the region. The main part of the movers moved to towns
or cities (Djuve and Kavli 2000).
Åslund (2001) ﬁnds that 37.6% of the refugee immigrants who were located according
to the Whole of Sweden Strategy during 1987-1989 had relocated to another municipality
within four years after the initial settlement. In addition, he ﬁnds that refugees tend to
leave small municipalities and are attracted to large municipalities.
In line with the relocation pattern found for refugee immigrants subjected to a settlement
policy in Norway or Sweden, Damm (2003) ﬁnds that 35% of 49,000 refugee immigrants
placed from 1986-1998 relocated to another municipality after 2-3 years. For refugee
immigrants placed in small municipalities, the relocation rate was as high as 54%.
2cies. The study by Edin et al. (2001) on labour market eﬀects of ’the Whole
of Sweden’ settlement policy is to our knowledge the only study addressing
this crucial issue, which is really the criterion on which the success of disper-
sal policies should be judged. They ﬁnd evidence that refugee immigrants
dispersed according to the Whole of Sweden Strategy experienced long-run
losses (measured in terms of earnings, idleness and welfare receipt) due to
the dispersal policy. They also stress, however, that the secondary migration
pattern actually lowers the potential long-run losses due to the policy because
of the tendency for refugees to migrate out of areas where their employment
prospects are bad. Speciﬁcally, their estimates suggest that the probability
of being idle would have been 20 percentage points higher if refugees had
stayed in the assigned municipalities rather than moved away.
In this paper, we address the issue of labour market eﬀects and residential
mobility eﬀects of dispersal policies theoretically. Speciﬁcally, we investigate
two important questions. First, we investigate how dispersal policies aﬀect
subsequent internal geographical mobility rates of refugee immigrants. Sec-
ond, we look into the impacts of dispersal policies on refugee immigrants’
job ﬁnding rates. Is it, for example, optimal for individuals located in less
immigrant-dense areas to reject job oﬀers until they have relocated into an
immigrant-dense area?
When investigating these issues, it is important to note that job and resi-
dential search are mutually dependent activities, because both wages and the
utility of living in a given location enter into an individual’s utility function.
Hence, both reservation values are likely to be aﬀected by changes in the
model parameters and, moreover, by the place utility oﬀered by the initial
location. In consequence, labour and residential mobility should be analysed
simultaneously, even if one only wants to answer questions regarding the
impact of dispersal policies on labour market integration.
A closely related literature exists, which explains job and residential mov-
ing behaviour for unemployed and employed workers in general. As noted
by Van Ommeren et al. (2000), many of these studies rely on a sequential
ordering of the decision to change residence or job. So individuals search
either for jobs given their residence or for a new residence given their job.
Examples of the former models include Sugden (1980), Simpson (1980), Van
Ophem (1991), Van den Berg (1992), Rouwendal and Rietveld (1994) and
Molho (2001). The latter models include Weinberg (1979), Weinberg et al.
(1981), Smith and Clark (1982), Clark and Flowerdew (1982) and Pickles
and Davies (1991). However, a theory which does not rely on such sequential
3ordering of the decision to change job or residence is better for understanding
the interaction between the two decisions. Some models of this kind do ex-
ist. Most of them are static equilibrium models in which unexpected shocks
and life-cycle changes play a key role, e.g. Weinberg (1979), Linneman and
Graves (1983), Zax and Kain (1991) and Zax (1991). However, the existence
of large once-only costs of moving implies that individuals are likely to ex-
hibit forward-looking behaviour which is captured by dynamic theories such
as search models. The simultaneous search model by Van Ommeren et al.
(1997, 2000) has both of these attractive features.
The point of departure of the Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) model is
that individuals maximise life-time utility by moving through diﬀerent labour
market and residential location states, while taking into consideration that
moving from one state to another is costly. Optimal strategies are derived
both for employed and non-employed individuals giving rise to four reserva-
tion value strategies, for job moves/acceptance and residential relocation for
employed and unemployed individuals, respectively. One of their main con-
clusions based on the search model is that the reservation wages for employed
and non-employed depend on labour market characteristics as well as housing
market characteristics. That is also the case for the reservation place utility.
According to their model, job and residential mobility of non-employed per-
sons are described by transition rates which are the product of oﬀer arrival
rates and the conditional probabilities of accepting an oﬀer. Comparative
static results for non-employed individuals show that the higher the cur-
rent place utility, the higher are the reservation wage and reservation place
utility. The interpretation of the ﬁrst result is that individuals with high
current place utility are more attached to their present location of residence
and therefore less willing to accept a job which induces a residential move.
The interpretation of the second result is straightforward, that the higher
your current place utility is, the better a residence oﬀer must be for you to
accept it. In consequence, the model by Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000)
predicts that the job-ﬁnding rate and housing mobility rate of non-employed
individuals are both decreasing in current place utility.
The model by Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) constitutes a good de-
scription of the interaction between job and residential mobility for native
born individuals. New immigrants, however, may initially diﬀer from individ-
uals in the workforce by lack of information necessary for conducting e.g. job
search outside a deﬁned local labour market. Furthermore, dispersal policies
aim at labour market integration of refugee immigrants within the region of
4assignment. For these two reasons, the distinction between the local labour
market and the national labour market is important for analysis of employ-
ment eﬀects of dispersal policies on refugee immigrants. The model by Van
Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000) does not distinguish between local and national
job search. The optimal search strategies for refugee immigrants may there-
fore be diﬀerent from those described in Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000).
To ﬁll this theoretical gap, we formulate a simultaneous job and residence
search model for refugee immigrants who are initially subject to a dispersal
policy.
In our model new refugee immigrants begin searching for a job and a new
residence simultaneously at the time at which they are granted asylum. First,
individuals can search for new residential location instead of the location of
assignment by the authorities. Second, they may search for a job locally, i.e.
within commuting distance of the present residential location, and ﬁnally
they may search for employment nationally, i.e. outside the local labour
market. As a result of the distinction between local and national job search,
commuting distance is taken into account implicitly in our model rather than
explicitly as in Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000). Hence, we are able to set
up a relatively simple model without loosing any important insights into
optimal search behaviour of non-employed individuals.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the optimal search strategies are
reservation strategies. Reservation wage and reservation place utility values
exist at which the individual is indiﬀerent between oﬀer acceptance and re-
jection, while it is optimal for the individual to accept wage and residence
oﬀers if the value of the oﬀer exceeds the reservation value. Hence, the opti-
mal search behaviour of an individual is described by transition rates given
a st h ep r o d u c to ft h eo ﬀer arrival rate and the probability of oﬀer accep-
tance. Second, the reservation wage for jobs in the local labour market is
lower than for a job with similar place utility in another labour market, be-
cause the latter involves costs of residential mobility. Third, comparative
static results include the following results. The reservation place utility is
increasing in the current place utility. In consequence, the transition rate of a
non-employed individual into a new region is decreasing in the current place
utility. The reservation wage for a national job is increasing in current place
utility. The implication is that the transition rate of a non-employed indi-
vidual into a job which requires a residential move is decreasing in current
place utility. In contrast, the reservation wage for a local job is decreas-
ing in the current place utility and, as a consequence, the transition rate
5into a local job is increasing in current place utility. A marginal change in
current place utility on the overall transition rate from non-employment to
employment, given by the sum of the transition rates into local and national
jobs, therefore has an ambiguous eﬀect. However, we argue that, in the case
of the Danish labour market (and most Western European labour markets,
too), the transition rate into employment is likely to be increasing in current
place utility. Finally, we argue that on average a dispersal policy on refugee
immigrants is likely to imply a low value of the current place utility. If so,
our model predicts that dispersal policy on refugee immigrants is likely to
lead to high transition rates of non-employed persons into new regions of res-
idence, low transition rates into local employment and high transition rates
into employment outside the local labour market.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The search framework of our basic
theoretical model is described informally in the next section. The basic two-
dimensional search model is described and formally set up in Section 3. The
optimal strategies are derived in Section 4. Section 5 presents comparative
statics results and their implications for dispersal policies are illustrated in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The search framework
In this section, we will informally present a dynamic theoretical framework
which describes the job and residential location search behaviour of refugee
immigrants from the time they are granted asylum until they ﬁnd their ﬁrst
job in the host country. In contrast to Van Ommeren et al. (1997, 2000),
commuting distance is not modelled explicitly but instead implicitly by the
distinction between local and national job search. The relationship between
job and residential location search behaviour will be described from a search-
theoretical perspective.
The point of departure is that individuals face a set of alternative res-
idential locations and a set of alternative employment opportunities. The
individual examines the costs and beneﬁts of any residential location or job
oﬀer. These costs and beneﬁts are a function of many characteristics such as
personal and household characteristics, current income and residential loca-
tion characteristics. The individual maximises utility by moving through dif-
ferent residential location states and by changing labour market state, while
taking into account once-only costs associated with changing residential lo-
6cation. However, we ignore search costs. We assume that an individual is
c o n t i n u o u s l ye n g a g e di ns e a r c hf o rab e tter residential location and in search
for a job. The rates at which a job or a residence is oﬀered, the so-called
job and housing oﬀer arrival rates, are determined by macro factors like job
availability and housing supply, but also by characteristics of the individual.
The job and housing oﬀer arrival rates are assumed to be exogenous.
As a national job is a job situated outside the local labour market (i.e.
outside feasible commuting distance) by assumption, the individual will have
to move in order to accept such a job oﬀer. In order to avoid further spec-
iﬁcational complexities, we assume that a job oﬀer in the national labour
market carries with it a residential oﬀer, that is, it is a draw from a bivariate
distribution of jobs and residential oﬀers.
In the job search literature, jobs are characterised by wages and workers
are assumed to prefer higher wages (see the overview paper by Devine and
Kiefer 1993). In the residential mobility literature, individuals are assumed
to prefer a higher place utility to a lower place utility, where place utility is
deﬁn e da st h eu t i l i t ye x p e r i e n c e di nac e r t a i nl o c a t i o nn e to fh o u s i n gc o s t s ,
w h i c hd e p e n do nt h es p e c i ﬁcb e n e ﬁts of the residential location (see Wolpert
1965, Yapa et al. 1971).2 We extend these standard assumptions by letting
jobs be characterised by wages as well as by their geographical location
relative to the current residential location: within commuting distance or
not.
3 Job and residence search: The model
The two-dimensional search model for refugee immigrants’ search for job
and residence is presented formally in this section. The model is formu-
l a t e di nc o n t i n u o u st i m e .T h ep o i n to fd e p a r t u r ei st h a tar e f u g e ei m m i g r a n t
is granted asylum and settled in a speciﬁc residential location away from
immigrant-dense areas by the authorities. The individual now searches con-
tinuously for a better residential location and simultaneously searches locally
and nationally for a job while receiving social assistance (SA) beneﬁts.3
2The concept of ’place utility’ was developed by Wolpert who deﬁned it as ”a positive
or negative quantity, expressing respectively the individual’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with respect to that place” (Wolpert 1965, 162).
3One might also consider a simpler model in which individuals can not receive social
assistance if they decide to move, a situation corresponding to the three-year ’integration
7Individuals derive utility from income y and place utility r.T h ei n c o m e
is SA beneﬁts b while non-employed, and the wage w while employed. The
instantaneous utility u experienced by an individual is assumed to be a linear
function of y and r,
u(y,r)=y + ar (1)
The instantaneous utility is increasing in income and place utility, the
marginal utility of income is constant over residential locations and the mar-
ginal place utility is constant over income levels. The cross-derivatives are
assumed to be zero because we want to focus on the ’pure’ dependencies
between the reservation strategies and not on dependencies arising from in-
teraction terms in the utility function. The individual faces once-only costs,
c, of changing residence.
From the individual’s point of view of, the economy consists of two labour
markets, the local labour market which contains all jobs within commuting
distance from the current location of residence, and the national labour mar-
k e tw h i c hc o n t a i n sa l lj o b si nt h er e s to ft h ec o u n t r y . W ea s s u m et h a tj o b
oﬀers in both regions arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
α1 in the local labour market and α2 in the national labour market. Thus,
in the real world α1 will typically be much larger than α2, see e.g. the study
by Munch et al. (2003). Note that a job oﬀer in the national labour market
carries with it a residential location oﬀer, because an individual cannot work
outside the local labour market without changing residence. Furthermore, in-
dividuals receive residence oﬀers from outside the local labour market (with
no associated job oﬀers) which arrive according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate β. The parallellity of these processes is described in Figure 1.
When a job oﬀer is accepted, the individual is assumed to keep the job
forever, i.e. no quits or layoﬀs occur and on-the-job search is ignored as well.
Job oﬀers, therefore, stop arriving once a job oﬀer is accepted. Moreover,
once a job is accepted, the individual also stops searching for a new residence
and thus settles down forever. We assume further that recall of oﬀe r si sn o t
allowed.
A residence oﬀer is entirely characterised by the place utility r and place
period’ prevailing in Denmark since 1999. One might also consider formulating the full
model with a three-year ’mobility restraint’. However, this model is non-stationary, and
two-dimensional non-stationary search theory is complex. Hence, for the moment, we will
abstract from such considerations and look at a stationary environment.
8Figure 1: Description of simultaneous search processes
Time until first residential offer, Tβ
Time until first national job offer, Tα2
Time until first local job offer, Tα1
Time=0
Time
utility oﬀers are random draws from a marginal distribution with CDF Fr(r).
A job is characterised by the wage w and by its location. Local job oﬀers are
random draws from the distribution with CDF Fw(w). National job oﬀers are
random draws from the joint wage and place utility distribution Fw,r(w,r).
We assume that w and r can take only non-negative values. The suprema




r, respectively. Moreover, for simplicity
we assume that fw,r(w,r)=fw(w)fr(r). Finally, the future is discounted at
rate ρ.
Note that the model is stationary. The value of being unemployed is the
discounted expected lifetime utility derived from income ﬂows (wages or SA
beneﬁts) and current place utilities, denoted by the value function V (r0),
where r0 denotes the place utility at the initial (exogenous) location. Note
that under the assumption of random initial location, which is basically what
the dispersal policy conducted in Denmark aspires at,4 the initial place utility
is a random draw from Fr(r).T h e ﬂow value of being non-employed with
initial place utility r0 is5
4Damm and Rosholm (2003) show that these aspirations are basically met, as the initial
distribution of refugee immigrants almost mirrors that of the native Danes.
5See the Appendix for the derivation of this equation.
9ρV (r0)=b + ar0 + α1Ew max[0,W(w,r0) − V (r0)] (2)
+α2Ew,r max[0,W(w,r) − c − V (r0)]
+βEr max[0,V(r) − c − V (r0)].
where the expectation operator takes expectations with respect to the dis-
tribution of the subscripted variable.
The interpretation of the asset equation 2 is as follows. The ﬂow value of
being non-employed is equal to the sum of four components:
1. The instantaneous utility of the current income and residence.
2. The expected surplus of a local job oﬀer times the rate at which local
job oﬀers arrive. This is also denoted the option value of local job
search.
3. The expected surplus of a national job (and residential) oﬀer times the
rate at which national job oﬀers occur. Denote this the option value of
national job search.
4. The expected surplus of a residential oﬀer times the rate at which res-
idence oﬀers arrive. Denote this the option value of residential search.
The ﬂow value of being non-employed can be shown to be increasing in
t h ec u r r e n tp l a c eu t i l i t y . 6 The intuition is that the higher the current place
utility, the higher is the instantaneous place utility and the option value of
local job search.
The value of being employed, W(w,r),i naj o bo ﬀering wage w and
place utility r is equal to the discounted value of the instantaneous utility of





since we have assumed that once accepted, a job is kept forever and that an
individual therefore stops searching for a new residential location, once he
has accepted a job. Obviously, the value of being employed is increasing in
the wage oﬀered in the accepted job.
With these speciﬁcations of the value functions, we can proceed to char-
acterize the optimal strategies of non-employed refugee immigrants.
6See the Appendix for the derivation of
∂V(r0)
∂r0 .
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In this section, we ﬁrst derive the optimal strategies when receiving a job or
residence oﬀer.
The assumptions that b<w, that the instantaneous utility function





and r∗(r0). w∗(r0) is the reservation




is a set of reservation wages for jobs
outside the commuting area. These are conditional on the current place
utility, r0, but also on the place utility associated with the job oﬀer, that
is, there is a distribution of reservation wages over associated place utilities.
Finally, r∗(r0) is the reservation place utility for residence oﬀers. In the rest
of the paper, the dependence of the reservation values on current reservation
place utility is suppressed for notational simplicity.7
The decision rules for an unemployed individual are then simply the reser-
vation strategies described below:
• Given a local job oﬀer of wage w and given the current place utility
r0, it is optimal to accept the local job oﬀer if w>w ∗, i.e. the wage
level at which an unemployed individual is indiﬀerent between taking
the job and remaining unemployed.
• Given a national job oﬀer of wage w and place utility r,a n dg i v e nt h e
current place utility r0 it is optimal for an unemployed individual to
accept the national job oﬀer if w>R w|r.
• Given a residential oﬀer of r and given the current place utility of r0, it
is optimal for an unemployed individual to accept the residential oﬀer
if r>r ∗.
These reservation strategies imply that job and residential mobility of
non-employed persons are described by transition rates which are the product
of the oﬀer arrival rate and the probability of accepting an oﬀer (conditional
on receiving one).
Let hl
u denote the transition rate into a local job. It is given by the
product of the local job oﬀer arrival rate and the probability of accepting an
oﬀer
7See the Appendix for the proof of existence of reservation values strategies.
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l
u = α1 [1 − Fw(w
∗)] (4)
Similarly, let hn
u denote the transition rate into a national job. It is given
analogously, by the product of the national job oﬀer arrival rate and the








The transition rate out of non-employment into employment, hu,i st h e






Finally, the transition rate into a new region of a still non-employed per-
son, denoted hr,i sg i v e nb yt h ep r o d u c to ft h er e s i d e n c eo ﬀer arrival rate
and the probability of oﬀer acceptance
hr = β [1 − Fr(r
∗)] (7)
Exploiting the reservation value properties, elaborating further on the
value function equations using integration by parts allows us to rewrite the
asset equation as


















∂V(r)/∂r · [1 − Fr(r)]dr (8)





At this reservation wage, the non-employed individual is indiﬀerent between
continuing search and accepting the oﬀered job, i.e. W(w∗,r 0)=V (r0).
These equations above imply that the reservation wage for local jobs is given
by
12w
∗ =  V (r0) − ar0 (9)
The reservation wage for a national job in a location oﬀering the same
place utility as the current is - by the same line of argument - given by
Rw|r0 =  V (r0)+ c − ar0 (10)
Therefore, we get the result that
Rw|r0 − w
∗ =  c > 0 (11)
This result is quite intuitive: The reservation wage for a job which requires
a residential move to a location oﬀering the exact same place utility as the
current place utility exceeds the reservation wage for local jobs by the ﬂow
value of the once-only costs of moving,  c.
If instead you receive a national job oﬀer in a location oﬀering place utility
r 6= r0
Rw|r =  V (r0)+ c − ar (12)
Therefore,
Rw|r − Rw|r0 = a(r0 − r) (13)
This expression is obviously positive for r<r 0 and negative otherwise.
So the reservation wage for national job oﬀers is negatively related to the
associated place utility. This may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst, but follows
straightforwardly from a result derived below, stating that the reservation
wage for local jobs is negatively related to the current place utility. The
intuition of the result will be outlined below.
Furthermore,
Rw|r − w
∗ = a(r0 − r)+ c (14)
which is unambigously positive for r<r 0 +
ρc
a , and negative otherwise.
5C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
We now present some comparative statics results many of which are useful
for the analysis of the implications of dispersal policies. Formal proofs of the
13following comparative statics propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. r∗ is increasing in r0.
The proposition states that the reservation place utility is increasing in
the current place utility. The result follows from the deﬁnition of the reser-
vation place utility and the fact that the value of being non-employed is
increasing in the current place utility. The intuition is straightforward. The
higher current place utility, the better must a residence oﬀer be for an indi-
vidual to accept it. Thus, living in a location which oﬀers a low place utility
implies a low reservation place utility and consequently a high transition rate
into a new region of residence, hr.
Corollary. The reservation place utility exceeds the current place utility.
The reason is that an individual has to be compensated for the once-only
costs of moving.
Proposition 2. Rw|r is increasing in r0, while w∗ is decreasing in r0.
This proposition states that the reservation wage for a job outside the
local labour market is increasing in current place utility while the reservation
wage for a local job is decreasing in the current place utility. Thus, living
in a place which oﬀers a low place utility implies a low reservation wage
for jobs involving a residential move and consequently a high transition rate
into such jobs, hn
u. The intuition for the result is that the lower current place
utility, the less attached is an individual to his current residential location,
and consequently, for a given place utility oﬀer r, the lower will the wage
oﬀers from outside the local labour market have to be to attract him the job.
Turning to the second result, an increase in the current place utility de-
creases the reservation wage for local jobs, because the option value of re-
ceiving a national job oﬀer and of receiving a residential oﬀer both decline.
Thus, living in a place which yields low place utility implies that an individual
must be ’compensated’ for the low place utility by a high wage. Therefore,
the individual will set a high reservation wage in the local job market and
consequently have a low local job ﬁnding rate, hl
u. A better local wage oﬀer
is needed to compensate the individual for the foregone option value from














0 [1 − Fw(Rw|r)]dFr(r)+
β
ρ [1 − Fr(r∗)]
The proposition states that the transition rate into employment is in-
creasing in current place utility, if the increase in the transition rate into
local jobs, resulting from the decline in the local job reservation wage, w∗,
exceeds the decline in the transition rate into jobs outside the local labour
market, resulting from the increase in the national job reservation wage, Rw|r.
In the case of the Danish labour market, this derivative is likely to be posi-
tive, as the transition rate into local jobs is close to 100 times larger than the
transition rate into jobs outside the local labour market. Hence, we would
expect the impact on the local job reservation wage to dominate.
Looking at another parameter which is of importance for dispersal poli-
cies, namely the arrival rate of local job oﬀers, we ﬁnd the following results.
Proposition 4. w∗ is increasing in α1 and Rw|r is increasing in α1.
The proposition states that the reservation wage for local jobs and the
reservation wage for national jobs are increasing in the local job oﬀer arrival
rate. This is a standard result, and it simply reﬂects that with more job
oﬀers, searching agents will become more picky.
Similarly, it is an equally well-known result that if the wage oﬀer distri-
bution is log-concave, the increase in the local job oﬀer arrival rate leads to
an increase in the transition rate into jobs in the local labour market (the
direct eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eo ﬀer arrival rate dominates the eﬀect of
the increase in the reservation wage). However, the transition rate into jobs
in the national labour market unambiguously declines. The overall impact
o nt h et r a n s i t i o nr a t ef r o mn o n - e m p l o y m e n tt oe m p l o y m e n tt h e nd e p e n d s
o nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h et w oe ﬀects. Once again, given the relative sizes
of these two hazard rates in most countries, our maintained hypothesis will
be that the overall job ﬁn d i n gr a t ei si n c r e a s i n gi nt h el o c a lj o bo ﬀer arrival
rate.
Comparative static results for α2 are derived analogously to the results
for α1. The results are as follows.
15Proposition 5. w∗ is increasing in α2 and Rw|r is increasing in α2.
The proposition states that the reservation wage for local jobs and the
reservation wage for national jobs are increasing in the national job oﬀer ar-
rival rate. Again this result reﬂects that with more job oﬀers, non-employed
agents will become more picky. The transition rate into local jobs unambigu-
ously decreases. The transition rate into jobs in the national labour market
will increase, given that the wage oﬀer distribution is log-concave, because
then the direct eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eo ﬀer arrival rate dominates the
eﬀect of the increase in the reservation wage. However, given the relative
sizes of these two hazard rates in most countries, one could easily ﬁnd that
the overall job ﬁnding rate decreases if the national job oﬀer arrival rate in-
creases. In any event, α2 is - as we have already mentioned a couple of times
- small relative to α1,a n ds oa n ye ﬀect of its change is likely to be fairly
small, too.
An increase in the local job oﬀer arrival rate has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the reservation place utility. Proposition 6 states that an increase in the local
job oﬀer arrival rate will lead to an increase in the reservation place utility































To interpret the condition, note the following. The ﬁrst two terms in
the inequality capture the total eﬀect of a change in local job oﬀer arrival
rate on the change in the option value of local job search due to a change in
current place utility from r0 to r∗.T h eﬁrst term is negative, while the latter
is positive. Hence, the sign of the total eﬀect on the change in option value
of local job search is ambiguous. The third, and last, term in the inequality
16captures the eﬀect of a change in local job oﬀer arrival rate on the change
in option value from national job search due to a change in current place
utility from r0 to r∗. The term is negative. Therefore, for the reservation
place utility to be increasing in the local job oﬀer arrival rate, the second
term in the inequality has to be large enough to more than compensate for
the two negative terms. Therefore, the interpretation of the condition is that
the reservation place utility is increasing in the local job oﬀer arrival rate,
if a higher local oﬀer arrival rate means a larger option value of local job
search that exceeds the loss in option value from national job search. If so,
the individual becomes less inclined to move when the local job oﬀer arrival
rate increases.
Similarly, an increase in the national job oﬀer arrival rate has an ambigu-


































The interpretation of the proposition is that the reservation place utility
is increasing in the national job oﬀer arrival rate, if the potential loss in the
option value from national job search due to a higher national job oﬀer arrival
rate (the net eﬀect of the two latter terms in the inequality) is more than
compensated by the gain in the option value from local job search due to a
higher national job oﬀer arrival rate (the ﬁrst term in the inequality).
176 Model implications of dispersal policy on
new refugees
We can use some of these comparative statics results to analyse the implica-
tions of a dispersal policy for new refugees. Dispersal policy is likely to imply
low average values of the current place utility, r0, e.g. due to lack of an ethnic
or immigrant network and lack of own inﬂuence on the choice of location.
S i n c er e f u g e ei m m i g r a n t sa r en o tf r e et oc h o o s ew h e r et ol i v e( t h a ti se x a c t l y
the implication of a dispersal policy), some of them will ﬁnd themselves in
locations to which they attribute very low place utility. Proposition 1 then
implies that, ap r i o r i ,dispersal policies are likely to lead to lower reservation
place utilities and consequently higher relocation rates. The high subsequent
migration rates of refugees who had initially been subject to dispersal policy
found in empirical studies for the US, Sweden, Norway and Denmark are
supportive evidence in favour of this hypothesis.
Moreover, Proposition 2 then implies that, ap r i o r i , dispersal policies -
low average values of current place utility - are expected to lead to lower
transition rates into local employment due to higher local reservation wages
and to higher transition into employment outside the local labour market due
to lower reservation wages in the national labour market. Hence, dispersal
policies have the likely implication that a better local wage oﬀer is needed
for local job acceptance to compensate the individual for the foregone option
value from national job search and residential search.
Furthermore, the implication of Proposition 3 is that theoretically the
eﬀect of dispersal policies on the job ﬁnding rate is ambiguous. However,
empirically the eﬀect is likely to be negative, at least for most European
labour markets, which are characterised by a transition rate into local jobs
close to 100 times larger than the transition rates into jobs outside the local
labour market. Hence, we would expect the impact on the local job reserva-
tion wage to dominate.
This may explain the empirical ﬁnding in Damm and Rosholm (2003) that
refugee immigrants who live in areas with a large concentration of country
fellowmen ﬁnd a job faster. This ﬁnding may thus not necessarily have
anything to do with the access to a larger social network, but may instead be
a consequence of their lower reservation wages! Moreover, upon correcting
for endogenous residential mobility, we ﬁnd in that paper that movers have
much larger job ﬁnding rates than stayers, even though the observed labour
18market characteristics of the municipalities, to which the refugee immigrants
were assigned under the dispersal policy, are more ’favourable’ to immigrants’
employment outcomes than the municipalities they subsequently move to.
This suggests that there are large reservation wage eﬀects, which are caused
by location characteristics which we do not observe in the data.
Dispersal policies also imply that the local job oﬀer arrival rate is ex-
ogenously given. Another interesting issue is therefore what the optimal
behaviour is for an individual who is assigned to a location characterised by
a relatively low job oﬀer arrival rate. However, the model is not ideal for
theoretical investigation of this issue, because it does not allow for diﬀer-
ences in the local job oﬀer arrival rate across regions; if a person moves from
one local labour market to another, the job oﬀer arrival rate in the new local
labour market stays the same as the job oﬀer arrival rate in the previous local
labour market. The local job oﬀer arrival rate relative to the national job
oﬀer arrival rate does not capture interregional diﬀerences in job oﬀer arrival
rates, but diﬀerences in job oﬀer arrival rates due to diﬀerences in local and
national job search methods. Local job search methods may, for instance,
result in more job oﬀers than national job search methods due to the network
of the individual relaying information about vacant jobs locally rather than
nationally or due to lower costs of showing up in person to apply for a job
locally rather than nationally. Thus, it would be interesting to extend the
model to allow for interregional diﬀerences in job oﬀer arrival rates since this
feature is necessary for derivation of theoretical labour market implications
of assignment to a region with a low job oﬀer arrival rate relatively to other
regions. Until then, one may argue that a decrease in the local unemploy-
ment rate relative to the local unemployment rate in other regions can be
captured in the present model framework by an increase in the current place
utility.
7C o n c l u s i o n
By setting up a simple partial search model in which non-employed agents
search continuously for jobs and new residences and deriving the optimal
search strategies of agents, we have explored the relationship between cur-
rent place utility, region-speciﬁco ﬀer arrival rates and transition rates into
employment and a new region of residence. Knowledge about these relation-
ships is useful for theoretical investigation of labour market and residential
19mobility implications of dispersal policies on refugee immigrants.
Most importantly, our analysis has demonstrated the following. First,
the reservation wage for jobs in the local labour market is lower than for a
job with similar place utility in another labour market, because the latter
involves costs of residential mobility. Second, the reservation place utility is
increasing in the current place utility. In consequence, the transition rate
of a non-employed individual into a new region is decreasing in the current
place utility. Third, the reservation wage for a national job is increasing in
current place utility. The implication is that the transition rate of a non-
employed individual into a job which requires a residential move is decreasing
in current place utility. In contrast, the reservation wage for a local job is
decreasing in the current place utility and, as a consequence, the transition
rate into a local job is increasing in current place utility. A marginal change
in current place utility on the overall transition rate from non-employment to
employment, given by the sum of the transition rates into local and national
jobs, therefore has an ambiguous eﬀect.
We argue that a dispersal policy on refugee immigrants is likely on aver-
age to imply a low value of the current place utility. If so, our model predicts
that dispersal policy on refugee immigrants is likely to lead to high transition
rates of non-employed persons into new regions of residence, low transition
rates into local employment and high transition rates into national employ-
ment. Theoretically, the eﬀect of dispersal policies on the job ﬁnding rate is
ambiguous. However, we argue that in the case of the Danish labour market
the local reservation wage eﬀect is likely to dominate. In consequence, the
transition rate into employment is likely to be increasing in current place
utility. In consequence, we would expect dispersal policies to have a negative
eﬀect on the overall job ﬁnding rate of non-employed refugee immigrants who
were initially subject to dispersal policy.
The model constructed is obviously quite stylized. Apart from the model
extension suggested in Section 6, future research might attempt to incorpo-
r a t et h ea s p e c tt h a to v e rt i m es p e n ti nt h eh o s tc o u n t r y ,i m m i g r a n t sb e c o m e
more employable due to acquisition of host-country-speciﬁc human capital
such as language. This employability aspect could be incorporated by assum-
ing that the job oﬀer arrival rate is increasing over time since immigration due
to increased employability. Alternatively, to avoid nonstationarity full em-
ployability could be assumed to arrive according to some stochastic process
a n dt h ej o bo ﬀer arrival rate could be assumed to be at a low level before
attainment of full employability and high afterwards.
20One might also consider the possibility that the place utility immigrants
attach to a certain location can change over time, as in a learning model.
Thus, the perception of locations which initially may seem unfriendly can
change as the refugee gets to know the local population etc. Of course, the
opposite may also happen, but the implication of a learning model would be
interesting to analyse.
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+Pr(Tα1 < min{Tα2,T β})ETα1
£
e−ρTα1|Tα1 < min{Tα2,T β}
¤
Ew max[V (r0),W(w,r0)]
+Pr(Tα2 < min{Tα1,T β})ETα2
£
e−ρTα2|Tα2 < min{Tα1,T β}
¤
Ewr max[V (r0),W(w,r) − c]
+Pr(Tβ < min{Tα1,T α2})ETβ
£
e−ρTβ|Tβ < min{Tα1,T α2}
¤
Er max[V (r0),V(r) − c]
where Tα1 denotes time until arrival of the next local job offer, Tα2 denotes time until
arrival of the next national job offer, Tβ denotes time until arrival of the next residence offer,
and ﬁnally T denotes the minimum of the three random variables Tα1,T α2 and Tβ. Further,
E denotes the expectation, i.e. ET [·] is the expected value of the term in the square brackets
where the expectation is taken with respect to the variable T,ρ denotes the discount rate
and W(w,r) is the value of being employed in a job offering w while living in a location
yielding place utility r. Since job and residence offers arrive according to Poisson processes
with arrival rates α1,α 2 and β, respectively, the random variables Tα1, Tα2 and Tβ are
exponentially distributed with parameters α1, α2 and β, respectively. One can show that
this implies that the minimum of the three random variables T is exponentially distributed
with the parameter α1 + α2 + β.1 The interpretation of the above formula is the following.
The value of being unemployed is equal to the sum of four components: First, the expected
discounted value of receiving the instantaneous utility of social assistance beneﬁts and the
current place utility r from now until the arrival of either a residence or a job offer, second,
the expected discounted value of receiving a local job offer times the probability of receiving
a local job offer before the arrival of a national job offer or a residence offer, third, the
expected discounted value of receiving a national job offer times the probability of receiving
a national job offer as the next offer, and ﬁnally the expected discounted value of receiving a
residence offer times the probability of receiving a residence offer before any job offers.
By calculating the expectiations on the right-hand side of Equation (A-1), we obtain the
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α1 + α2 + β + ρ
Ewr max[V (r0),W(w,r) − c]
+
β
α1 + α2 + β + ρ
Er max[V (r0),V(r) − c] (A-2)




.T h e n
T ∼ Exp(α1 + α2 + β).
Proof: Pr(T<t )=1− Pr(T>t )=1− Pr(Tα1 >t , T α2 >t , T β >t )=
1 − Pr(Tα1 >t )Pr(Tα2 >t )Pr(Tβ >t )=1− e−α1te−α2te−βt =1− e−(α1+α2+β)t.
24Multiplication by the factor (α1 + α2 + β + ρ) on both sides and subtracting
(α1 + α2 + β)V (r0) from both sides of Equation (A-2) in order to isolate ρV (r0), Equation
(A-2) can be rewritten in a more familiar form of a ﬂow value or asset equation,
ρV (r0)=b + ar0 + α1Ew max[0,W(w,r0) − V (r0)]
+α2Ewr max[0,W(w,r) − c − V (r0)]
+βEr max[0,V(r) − c − V (r0)] (A-3)








































α1 + α2 + β + ρ
=
b + ar0
α1 + α2 + β + ρ
(A-4)
Concerning the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (A-1),
Pr(Tα2 < min{Tα2,T β})ETα1
£












α1 + α2 + β + ρ
(A-5)
The third and fourth probability terms on the right-hand side of Equation (A-1) are
calculated analogously!
It is fairly easy to show that a local reservation wage exists for unemployed individuals.
Since W(w,r0) is strictly increasing in w and V (r0) is constant in w, a cut-off wage level








> 0 and ∂V(r0)/∂w =0
⇒∃ w∗(r0) s.t.W(w∗(r0),r 0)=V (r0) (A-6)
Moreover, note that Pr(W(w,r0) ≤ V (r0)) = Pr(W(w,r0) ≤ W(w∗(r0),r 0)) =
Pr(w ≤ w∗(r0)) = Fw(w∗(r0)) since W(w,r0) is increasing in w and w∗(r0) exists.








> 0 and ∂V(r0)/∂w =0
⇒∀ r ∃Rw|r(r0) s.t.W(Rw|r(r0),r)=V (r0)+c (A-7)
since u0
y(y,r0) > 0 ⇒ u0
w(w,r0) > 0. Naturally, we also need the additional assumption
here that b<w.
Moreover, note that Pr(W(w,r) − c ≤ V (r0)) = Pr(W(w,r) − c ≤
W(Rw|r(r0),r 0)) = Pr(w ≤ Rw|r(r0)) = Fw(Rw|r(r0)) since W(Rw|r(r0),r 0)
is increasing in w and Rw|r(r0) exists.
Similarly, a cut-off place utility level r∗(r0) exists at which V (r∗(r0)) − c = V (r0),
because V (r) is strictly increasing in r since u0
r(y,r0) > 0 and u0
yr(w,r0)=0 ,w h e r e a s
V (r0) is constant in r,
∂V(r)/∂r > 0 and ∂V(r0)/∂r =0⇒∃ r∗(r0) s.t. V (r∗(r0)) = V (r0)+c (A-8)
r∗(r0) is called the reservation place utility level.
Moreover, since V (r) is strictly increasing in r, Pr(V (r) − c<V(r0)) = Pr(V (r) ≤
V (r∗(r0))) = Pr(r<r ∗(r0)). = Fr(r∗(r0)).
Where possible, the dependence of the reservation values on current place utility is
suppressed in the rest of the Appendix for notational simplicity.
That V (r) is strictly increasing in r can be seen from derivation of Equation (A-2) with
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a + α1 Pr(W(w,r0) >V(r0))
∂W(w,r0)
∂r0
  + α1 [1 − Pr(W(w,r0) ≤ V (r0)] + α2 [1 − Pr(W(w,r) − c ≤ V (r0))] + β [1 − Pr(V (r) − c ≤ V (r0))]
This expression is positive, since all terms in the numerator and the denominator are
positive. Note that in the absence of national job search and residential search
∂V(r0)
∂r0 would
simply be equal to a
 .
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∂r0 is greater than zero since u0
r0(b,r0) > 0 and α1,α 2,β,ρ>0.
Exploiting the reservation value properties, elaborating further on the value function
equations using integration by parts produces
ρV (r0)=b + ar0 + α1
Z w
w∗











[V (r) − c − V (r0))]dFr(r)
= b + ar0 + α1
Z w
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∂V(r)/∂r · [1 − Fr(r)]dr (A-10)
27PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
The reservation place utility r∗ is deﬁned as the place utility for which
V (r∗)=V (r0)+c




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:







where the positive sign of
∂(V (r0))
∂r0 was derived above.




















































∂V(r)/∂r · [1 − Fr(r)]dr
This derivative is negative because the denominator is positive and the numerator
unambigously negative, because both terms in the numerator are negative. The second term
in the numerator is clearly negative, since the option value of further residential search
obviously declines with the current place utility. In the extreme, if you live in the region
offering the highest place utility, the option value of further residential search is 0.T h eﬁrst
term in the numerator is negative, because
∂Rw|r
∂r0 > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The transition rate out of non-nemployment is the sum of the local job ﬁnding rate and
the national job ﬁnding rate





The derivative of this transition rate from non-employment into employment with respect











Inserting the expression for
∂V(r0)
∂r0 into the expression for ∂hu














0 [1 − Fw(Rw|r)]dFr(r)+
β
ρ [1 − Fr(r∗)]
,
Derivation of ∂r∗
∂α1 : Subtracting the value functions evaluated at r0 and r∗ and exploiting
the signs of the derivatives of the reservation values wrt. the current place utility, we obtain
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r∗ [V (r) − c − V (r∗)]Fr(r)dr + β[1 − Fr(r∗)]c +  c
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Rw|r(r0) [1 − Fw(w)]dwdFr(r)
+β
R r∗∗
r∗ [V (r) − c − V (r0)]Fr(r)dr + β[1 − Fr(r∗∗)]c +  c
)
where r∗∗ denotes the reservation place utility given current place utility equal to, that is,
r∗∗ = r∗( r∗(r0)).
The interpretation of the expression is that reservation place utility for a given current
place utility is equal to the sum of the current place utility, the ﬂow value of the costs of
moving per marginal place utility unit, compensation for the loss in the option value of
receiving a national job offer and a residential offer (due to the declining local reservation
wage), which is partially offset by the increase in the option value of local job search (due to
the declining local reservation wage).
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 4 AND 6:
We now turn to derivation of comparative static results for a marginal change in α1.
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(A-17)
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(A-18)


































































r and rn∗ denotes the reservation place utility value given current place
utility r(n−1)∗, n ∈ Z. Because rn∗ −→
_
r, the last term on the right-hand side of Equation
(A-21) is approximately equal to zero, and using the result in Equation (A-20) we see that
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The numerator of the expression for
∂V(r0)
∂α1 in Equation (A-23) gives the direct effect of a
marginal change in the local job offer arrival rate which is positive, whereas the denominator
captures that the indirect effects are negative and smaller than the direct effect in absolute
terms, so that the overall effect is positive but less than the direct effect.







These signs are as expected. The interpretation is that the higher the local job offer
arrival rate, the more choosy is it optimal for a person to be wrt. both local and national job
acceptance.
In addition, using the results in Equation (A-21), Equation (A-24) and Equation (A-25),
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The sign of the derivative of the reservation place utility wrt. the local job offer arrival
rate is ambigous, because the ﬁrst and third terms on the right-hand side of Equation (A-27)
are negative (since
∂Rw|r(r0)




PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 5 AND 7:
Comparative statics for the national job offer arrival rate are derived analogously.
However, let us brieﬂy show the main calculations. Deriving the two different expressions







































Rw|r(r0) [1 − Fw(w)]dwdFr(r)
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The sign of ∂r∗
∂α2 is ambiguous, because the ﬁrst and the last term on the right-hand side
of Equation (A-33) are positive (since
∂w∗(r0)
∂r0 < 0), while the second term on the right-hand
side is negative (since
∂Rw|r(r0)
∂r0 > 0).
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